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CREATING A SYSTEM FOR CITIZEN PARTICIPATION:  
HOW THE NONPROFIT SECTOR CAN PROVIDE 
CITIZENS A VOICE IN TOKYO’S URBAN 
DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM 
Nicolas J. Vikstrom† 
 
 
Abstract: Recent changes in Japan’s civil society together with the current 
political and economic environment have created the first opportunity to develop a viable 
nonprofit sector that represents citizen interests and allows for public participation in 
Tokyo’s urban development scheme.  Tokyo’s urban environment has failed to meet the 
social and cultural needs of its citizens due to unprecedented economic and industrial 
growth from the beginning of the Meiji era until the 1990s.  Through this extended period 
of growth, the goal for urban development was solely to increase Tokyo’s economic 
strength, while social needs were not addressed.  While the City Planning Law of 1968 
(“CPL”) sought to require citizen participation in urban planning, the law was largely 
ineffective due to its narrow scope and weak legal remedies.  During much of the 
twentieth century, Tokyo’s governance was controlled by an iron triangle comprised of 
bureaucracy, government, and big business, which drove Tokyo’s economic growth. This 
form of governance did not allow citizens to participate in the political process.  The iron 
triangle lost its strength only after the collapse of the economic bubble in the 1990s.  
With urban development failing to meet the needs of the citizens and the iron triangle 
having lost its strength, citizens groups began to assert more influence over the city’s 
governance.  Successes for the citizens groups and growing media attention prompted the 
promulgation of the Nonprofit Organizations Law of 1998 (“NPO Law”).  The NPO Law 
created a framework for a nonprofit sector and began to strengthen its legitimacy.  Unlike 
past attempts to introduce a viable nonprofit sector, the NPO Law came at a time when 
the political and economic environments of the city allowed for outside influence in the 
political process.  While the foundation has now been laid for a viable nonprofit sector, 
the sector must gain legitimacy and independence before it is a truly viable means to 
public participation.  With increased legitimacy and independence, Japan’s nonprofit 
sector will serve to improve the urban development scheme by balancing the interests of 
citizens and corporations and meet long-standing social goals.   
I. INTRODUCTION 
 Residents of Kunitachi, a suburb west of Tokyo, are proud of the 
roadside trees and stylish street lights along Daigaku Dori (University 
Avenue).1  The town is known as a college town and has attracted famous 
writers, painters, and sculptors who are fond of the town’s sakura (cherry 
                                           
†
 The author would like to thank the diligent and hard-working members of the Pacific Rim Law & 
Policy Journal and Professor Veronica Taylor for their insight, assistance, and editorial advice.  The author 
also wishes to thank his friends and family for their support and patience throughout the writing process.  
Any errors or omissions are the author's own. 
1
  Kunitachi City, available at http://members.tripod.com/~callstudy/Kunitachi/Kunitachi.html (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2005). 
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blossom) lined streets.2  These are the avenues that often appear in television 
love stories.3  These same streets are also threatened by Tokyo’s prevailing 
goal of economic growth and development, and citizens have little power to 
influence future urban development. 
The consequences of Tokyo’s economic focus have recently reached 
Japan’s courts in a case involving the Kunitachi section of western Tokyo.4  
The case involves a condominium complex in Kunitachi’s scenic district that 
for decades had a voluntary height restriction of twenty meters. 5   A 
developer, Meiwa Estate Co. (“Meiwa”), purchased the land and sought to 
build a forty-three-meter-tall building on the scenic avenue.6  Concerned 
citizens brought suit against Meiwa to prevent construction of the 
condominium complex, arguing that it destroyed scenery along University 
Avenue.7  Specifically, the residents claimed that the apartment complex 
“seriously violated their rights to scenery and sunlight, and created a strong 
feeling of oppression among the residents.”8  In a landmark decision, a three 
judge panel of the Tokyo District Court found in favor of the plaintiffs, 
ordering Meiwa to remove the top twenty-three meters of the forty-three-
meter building.9  Judge Akira Miyaoka stated, “The condominium violates 
the local residents’ rights to scenery.”10  Meiwa argued that they acted within 
the legal restrictions for the site, which did not include a mandatory height 
restriction.11  On appeal, the Tokyo High Court overruled the lower court, 
finding that Meiwa was within the municipal code in force at the time of 
construction.12  The Court stated, “Beautiful scenery is a mutual asset that 
benefits all people and residents. But this does not mean that individual 
residents can claim private rights to enjoy the scenery.”13  The citizens have 
indicated their intent to immediately appeal the decision to the Japanese 
Supreme Court.14  Without changing the urban development system, citizens 
                                           
2
  Id. 
3
  Id. 
4
  Court Orders Complex to Lose Seven Floors, JAPAN TIMES ONLINE, Dec. 19, 2002, 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/makeprfy.pl5?nn20021219a1.htm. 
5
  Yumi Wijers-Hasegawa, Judge Reverses Kunitachi Ruling, JAPAN TIMES ONLINE, Oct. 28, 2004, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/print/news/nn10-2004/nn20041028a3.htm. 
6
  Appeal Court Rules Kunitachi High-Rise Condominium Legal, MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, Jun. 7, 
2002, at 8. 
7
  Wijers-Hasegawa, supra note 5.  
8
  Id. 
9
  Court Orders Complex to Lose Seven Floors, supra note 4. 
10
  Id. 
11
  Wijers-Hasegawa, supra note 5. 
12
  Id. 
13
  Id. 
14
  Id. 
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have no means to effectively participate in decisions affecting the 
development of their urban environment. 
Citizen participation15 in the urban development of Tokyo has been 
limited from the beginning of the Meiji era in 1868.16  The highly centralized 
and paternalistic government17 allowed for rapid growth as well as efficient 
and effective redevelopment18 in the face of massive urban destruction in the 
beginning of the nineteenth century.19  The preeminent goals for Tokyo from 
the end of the nineteenth century to the early 1990s were industrial and 
economic growth. 20   These goals did not allow for effective citizen 
participation.21  Following the destruction of the Great Kantō Earthquake 
and World War II until the 1960s, however, Tokyo citizens largely believed 
that economic and industrial recovery needed to take precedence over socio-
cultural goals.22  It was not until the citizens’ movements of the 1960s that 
pressure was applied to change the urban development structure. 
Pressure for increased citizen participation in the urban development 
system began to grow in the 1960s,23 but Tokyo’s political and economic 
environment prevented significant changes to the system.24  The result of the 
successful redevelopment of Tokyo after World War II was a strong political 
iron triangle comprised of government, bureaucracy, and big business.25  The 
                                           
15
  “Citizen participation,” “citizen involvement,” and “public participation” are used interchangeably 
and are used here in their most general sense.  The terms include any activity, organized, independent, or 
otherwise, in which private citizens provide input to the political or administrative process of urban 
development.  Common forms of citizen participation include, but are not limited to, participating in public 
hearings, commenting on development projects, and participating in groups such as neighborhood 
associations or other interest groups.   
16
  ANDRÉ SORENSEN, THE MAKING OF URBAN JAPAN: CITIES AND PLANNING FROM EDO TO THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 54 (2002).  “The role of government was to strengthen the country while the role 
of the people was to serve the emperor. . . . Little political space was left for the development of 
independent conceptions of the public good, or for activities that might support them.”  Id. 
17
  Id. at 52-54. 
18
  See id. at 178-83. 
19
  The destruction caused by the Great Kantō Earthquake of 1923 and by World War II is discussed 
infra Part II.B. 
20
  SORENSEN, supra note 16, at 178. 
21
  Id. at 208. 
22
  The term “socio-cultural goals” will be used to describe, in general, the largely intangible goals 
that a community holds to improve the livability of their local environment.  Common goals included 
within this category are the desire for green spaces, access to air and light, convenient access to everyday 
needs such as grocery stores, a clean environment, reliable transportation, efficient roads, and access to 
public transportation.  This list of goals serves simply to aid in the understanding of the term “socio-
cultural goals”; it is by no means an inclusive list and many of the goals may also fit within the desired 
goals for other objectives such as economic growth. 
23
  See generally ROMAN CYBRIWSKY, TOKYO: THE CHANGING PROFILE OF AN URBAN GIANT 93-97 
(1991) (discussing Tokyo’s urban problems in the 1960s and 70s). 
24
  See generally Tom Ginsburg, Dismantling the “Developmental State”? Administrative Procedure 
Reform in Japan and Korea, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 585 (2001). 
25
  Id. at 589. 
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iron triangle governance prevented individuals from affecting change in the 
urban development.  Furthermore, the legal structure in Japan made it 
difficult for nonprofit organizations (“NPOs”) 26  to form or function. 27  
Citizen participation gained a few small footholds at this time.  Although the 
City Planning Law of 1968 required citizen consent in urban development 
projects,28 and a few small judicial victories gave citizens some influence 
over the urban development system,29 these victories did not eclipse the 
strength and influence of the iron triangle and citizen participation remained 
limited. 
The first major steps toward allowing citizen participation in the urban 
development system came in the early 1990s.  The collapse of the economic 
bubble reduced the strength of the iron triangle and allowed citizen groups to 
assert more effective influence over the Tokyo government.30  The Kobe 
earthquake of 1995 was also an effective catalyst for NPOs, bringing 
attention both to the effectiveness of NPOs and to the ineffectiveness of the 
government in response to the earthquake.31  The weakened political iron 
triangle, paired with the favorable media attention for the nonprofit sector, 
allowed for the hasty passage of the Nonprofit Organizations Law of 1998 
(“NPO Law”).32   
The promulgation of the NPO Law created the first viable framework 
for citizen participation in the urban development system in Tokyo.  In order 
to move from a framework for citizen participation to actual participation, 
the nonprofit sector must first gain legitimacy and independence.33  Gaining 
local constituent support and improving the reputation of the NPOs in local 
                                           
26
  References to the nonprofit sector and nonprofit organizations (“NPOs”) are to organizations 
formed for the good of the general public.  As the terms are generally recognized in Japan, NPOs refer to 
domestic organizations, working in the interests of Japan’s citizens and does not include international aid 
organizations that are referred to as nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”).  Unless otherwise noted, 
this Comment does not distinguish between organizations organized under the NPO Law of 1998 and those 
not formally organized. 
27
  See generally Takako Amemiya, The Nonprofit Sector: Legal Background, in THE NONPROFIT 
SECTOR IN JAPAN 59-98 (Tadashi Yamamoto ed., 1998). 
28
   See Byron Shibata, Development Procedure Law in Japan: Its Operation and Effects on Law and 
Economy, 20 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 149 (2003) [hereinafter Shibata 2003].  See generally Byron Shibata, 
Land Use Law in the United States and Japan: A Fundamental Overview and Comparative Analysis, 10 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 161 (2002) [hereinafter Shibata 2002]. 
29
  SORENSEN, supra note 16, at 210. 
30
  Id. at 296-97. 
31
  See generally Makoto Imada, The Voluntary Response to the Hanshin Awaji Earthquake: A 
Trigger for the Development of the Voluntary and Non-Profit Sector in Japan, in THE VOLUNTARY AND 
NON-PROFIT SECTOR IN JAPAN 40-50 (Stephen P. Osborne ed., 2003). 
32
  Robert Pekkanen, The Politics of Regulating the Non-Profit Sector, in THE VOLUNTARY AND NON-
PROFIT SECTOR IN JAPAN 53-75 (Stephen P. Osborne ed., 2003). 
33
  See infra Part V.C. 
FEBRUARY 2006 CREATING A SYSTEM FOR CITIZEN PARTICIPATION 335 
communities will improve NPO legitimacy.34  Building a sound financial 
base independent from government funding will allow NPOs to gain 
independence.35  To bring this about, the tax structure of NPOs must be 
changed; there must be tax incentives for people to contribute to NPOs.36  
With the respect of the community and the ability to act independently from 
the government, the nonprofit sector would have the opportunity to 
effectively represent the interests of Tokyo citizens. 
This Comment argues that the recently developed framework for a 
nonprofit sector representing the interests of the citizens of Tokyo embodies 
the first viable means of meeting the socio-cultural goals for urban 
development.  Part II discusses the modern historical development of urban 
planning in Tokyo and describes the political and economical forces that 
have shaped urban development and planning.  Part III explains Tokyo’s 
previous attempts to introduce citizen participation into the urban 
development scheme as well as the impediments to these early attempts.  
Part IV analyzes Tokyo’s goals for urban development and why many of 
these goals have not been successfully implemented.  Finally, Part V argues 
that the recent emergence of a framework for a nonprofit sector in Japan can 
meet Tokyo’s goals for urban development. 
II. TO RECOVER FROM THE DISASTERS OF THE EARLY TWENTIETH 
CENTURY, JAPAN ENFORCED A HIGHLY CENTRALIZED URBAN 
DEVELOPMENT SCHEME THAT EMPHASIZED ECONOMIC GROWTH 
 The repeated destruction of Tokyo in the early twentieth century 
shaped the city’s urban development scheme and created tension between 
the necessities created by wartime ruin and the socio-cultural needs of its 
citizens.  Despite its history of destruction, Tokyo quickly and capably 
recovered from the disasters.37   The key to this success was the hyper-
centralized governance that emphasized economic growth.38  The price of 
this success was an absence of citizen participation in the urban development 
scheme, resulting in citizens becoming disconnected from a “town” they 
once knew.39  Post-war Tokyo was a place for economic prosperity and 
decidedly not a place for emphasizing the needs of the citizens. 
                                           
34
  Robert O. Bothwell, The Challenges of Growing the NPO and Voluntary Sector in Japan, in THE 
VOLUNTARY AND NON-PROFIT SECTOR IN JAPAN 129-33 (Stephen P. Osborne ed., 2003). 
35
  Id. at 137-39. 
36
  Id. at 145. 
37
  See infra Part II.C. 
38
  Id. 
39
  Id. 
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A. The Meiji Period Resulted in Rapid Urban and Industrial 
Development, but Failed to Incorporate Citizen Participation 
 The story of Tokyo’s urban development begins largely with the fall 
of the Shogun and restoration of imperial rule in 1868.40  This era, termed 
Meiji or “enlightened rule,” had a particularly strong impact on Tokyo’s 
urban development.41  Shortly before the beginning of the Meiji era, the 
United States entered Japan to open trade relations, effectively ending 250 
years of Japanese isolation.42  Japanese ports became open to both foreign 
trade and the exchange of ideas.43  In 1868, Tokyo became the imperial 
capital.  The imperial government set a goal of modernizing Tokyo 
physically and culturally under the Western influence.44  It was in the Meiji 
period that Tokyo began to emerge as an industrial center in Japan.  With 
heavy government and private investment in industry and factory 
production, Tokyo became Japan’s leading manufacturing city.45  The Meiji 
period saw Tokyo’s population boom, 46  vast improvements in urban 
infrastructure, and tremendous downtown growth, as well as increasing 
cultural opportunities for the citizens.47 
B. The Great Kantō Earthquake and World War II Devastated Tokyo, but 
Provided an Opportunity to Properly Redevelop the City 
 The period of growth and prosperity of the Meiji era came to an 
abrupt end in 1923 with the Great Kantō Earthquake, which struck just off 
the shore of Tokyo in Sagami Bay (“the Great Quake”).48  The Great Quake 
devastated the city, toppling buildings, and sparking scores of fires and a fire 
storm that in turn triggered cyclones and other weather patterns that killed 
tens of thousands more citizens.49  All told, over 100,000 citizens perished 
and seventy-three percent of the houses in Tokyo were damaged or 
destroyed.50 
                                           
40
  CYBRIWSKY, supra note 23, at 62. 
41
  Id. at 63. 
42
  Id. at 62. 
43
  Id. 
44
  Id. at 63. 
45
  Id. at 72. 
46
  The population of Tokyo grew from 600,000 at the time of the Meiji restoration in 1868 to 2.2 
million at the end of the era.  Michael Wegener, Tokyo’s Land Market and its Impact on Housing and 
Urban Life, in PLANNING FOR CITIES AND REGIONS IN JAPAN 93 (Philip Shapira, Ian Masser & David W. 
Edgington eds., 1994). 
47
  CYBRIWSKY, supra note 23, at 76. 
48
  Id. at 78. 
49
  Id. at 78-81. 
50
  Id. at 80. 
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 Prior to the Great Quake, Tokyo had plans to redevelop its heavily 
industrialized city to better meet the needs of its citizens.51  Gōtō Shimpei, former 
mayor of Tokyo, researched how to redevelop and address the needs of the growing 
city.52  Gōtō sought input from leading American planners and established the 
Tokyo Institute for Municipal Research (“the Institute”) in order to meet his 
planning goals.53  The Institute’s proposal was an 800 million yen project referred to 
as “the big kerchief” because it covered so much of the city.54  The plans included 
paving and widening the streets, expanding water, electrical, and gas services, 
improving the harbor and waterways, building parks, schools, municipal buildings, 
and public structures, and offering a wide variety of new social services for the 
citizens of Tokyo.55  These plans ultimately proved cost prohibitive, however, and 
Gōtō’s grand scheme never came to fruition.56 
 With the devastation of the Great Quake, Gōtō had the opportunity to rebuild 
the city.  However, his plans, at three times the amount of the national budget, were 
again cost prohibitive.57  Because the economy of Tokyo was destroyed, Tokyo was 
forced to rebuild largely with the same insufficient design as prior to the Great 
Quake with “narrow streets, slum areas, open sewers, and many other urban 
maladies.”58  With the introduction of Western-style apartments, despite the wide-
spread destruction of the Great Quake, the city’s population continued to grow in the 
1920s and 1930s.59 
 Nearly as soon as Tokyo began to recover from the devastation of the Great 
Quake, Tokyo’s population was again devastated—this time by the U.S. bombing 
campaigns of World War II.  In the winter of 1944-45, the United States attacked 
Tokyo over 100 times, again leading to the deaths of over 100,000 citizens.60  The 
attacks culminated in March 1945 when, in the course of three hours, American 
bombers dropped over 700,000 incendiary bombs on Tokyo, which alone killed 
over 77,000 civilians and destroyed over 276,000 buildings,61  reducing most of the 
post-earthquake reconstruction to ashes.62 
                                           
51
  Id. at 81. 
52
  Id. 
53
  Id. 
54
  Id. 
55
  Id. 
56
  Id. at 82. 
57
  Id. 
58
  Id. (citing Y. HAYASE, THE CAREER OF GŌTŌ SHINPEI: JAPAN’S STATESMEN OF RESEARCH, 1857-
1929 (1974)).   
59
  The population of Tokyo grew from 2.2 million at the end of the Meiji period to 6.8 million at the 
end of the 1930s.  Wegener, supra note 46, at 93-95. 
60
  CYBRIWSKY, supra note 23, at 83-84. 
61
  Id. at 84. 
62
  TOKYO METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT, A HUNDRED YEARS OF TOKYO CITY PLANNING 44 (1994) 
[hereinafter A HUNDRED YEARS OF TOKYO CITY PLANNING]. 
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C. Tokyo’s Urban Recovery Focused Solely on Promoting Economic and 
Industrial Growth 
 World War II marked the final great destruction of Tokyo and set the 
stage for a great modern-day miracle of urban reconstruction and renewal.63  
The end of the war was perhaps the single most important event in Tokyo’s 
city planning history and can mark the beginning of the modern Tokyo urban 
plan.64   Unfortunately, the beginning of this era was characterized by a 
desperate need to meet the short-term goal of redevelopment.65  The wartime 
population of Tokyo dropped to 2.8 million, but after the war, citizens 
returned to the city along with repatriates from Japan’s colonies and a large 
number of rural immigrants. 66   Tokyo’s population ballooned to seven 
million by 1955, making even the city’s large public housing programs 
grossly inadequate. 67   Tokyo was forced to forsake grander goals of 
modernization for more fundamental needs.68  
 Governance in Japan was controlled by a powerful iron triangle 
composed of government, bureaucracy, and big business.69  The centralized 
control of power, with blurred lines and members intermingling between all 
three groups, created an environment that allowed for tremendous economic 
growth and consistent promulgation of pro-business policies.70  This left 
little room for outside forces such as citizen groups or nonprofit 
organizations to influence the governance of Japan.71  Practically speaking, 
Tokyo’s post-war needs were two-fold:  to house an unexpectedly growing 
population and to achieve economic stability and independence.72  To meet 
these goals, a hyper-centralized government was created with politicians, 
bureaucracy, and big-business driving the goal of economic growth.73  The 
result was a tremendous financial success that allowed Japan to catapult 
itself into being one of the most economically successful powers in the 
                                           
63
  CYBRIWSKY, supra note 23, at 86-87. 
64
  World War II provides a logical starting point for this discussion regarding Tokyo’s urban 
development.  For a thorough historical analysis of Tokyo and Japan’s development, see generally 
CYBRIWSKY, supra note 23.  See also RICHARD STORRY, A HISTORY OF MODERN JAPAN (rev. vol. 1983). 
65
  SORENSEN, supra note 16, at 152. 
66
  Wegener, supra note 46, at 95. 
67
  Id. 
68
  “Tokyo recovered rapidly from the devastation of the earthquake and the war but sacrificed long-
range plans for the optimal functional use of the city.”  Takashi Hirai, The Heart of Tokyo:  Today’s Reality 
and Tomorrow’s Vision, in JAPANESE URBAN ENVIRONMENT 26 (Gideon Golany, Keisuke Hanaki & 
Osamu Koide eds., 1998).. 
69
  Ginsburg, supra note 24, at 589. 
70
  Id. 
71
  Id. 
72
  A HUNDRED YEARS OF TOKYO CITY PLANNING, supra note 62, at 50-51. 
73
  Ginsburg, supra note 24, at 585. 
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world.  The cost of this success, however, was that citizens lacked any type 
of participatory role in urban development decisions and Japan’s modern 
culture was shaped by the single goal of economic growth. 
III. EARLY ATTEMPTS TO INCORPORATE CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT INTO 
TOKYO’S URBAN DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM WERE UNSUCCESSFUL 
The first attempts to incorporate citizen involvement into urban 
development realized only small victories.  City planners recognized the 
importance of having a livable city that met the citizens’ socio-cultural goals 
long before the city’s modern urban development scheme.74  Despite the 
recognized importance of the socio-cultural goals, citizens accepted the fact 
that housing and economic needs in post-war Tokyo trumped these goals.75  
In the 1960s and 1970s, however, Tokyo’s citizens began to decry the 
condition of Tokyo’s urban development.76  It is in this era that the citizens 
began to press for an improved urban development system that incorporated 
citizen involvement.  The citizens ultimately realized some success, 
including the passage of the City Planning Law of 1968 (“CPL”).77  After 
the passage of the CPL, citizens continued to press for change at the polls 
and in the courtroom.  While the citizens were victorious at the polls and in a 
few influential court decisions,78 the success of their efforts was limited 
because economic growth continued in Tokyo.79  This continued economic 
growth allowed the iron triangle to block outside influences, including 
citizen participation, from entering the political process. 
                                           
74
  See CYBRIWSKY, supra note 23, at 81 (discussing Gōtō Shimpei’s lofty development plans prior to 
the Great Kanto Earthquake). 
75
  See infra Part III.A. 
76
  See CYBRIWSKY, supra note 23, at 200-03. 
77
  Toshi Keikaku Ho [City Planning Law], Law No. 100 of 1968, art. 33(14) [hereinafter CPL].  For 
a thorough examination of the specific articles of the CPL, see generally Shibata 2003, supra note 28, at 
154. 
78
  The most influential cases include: Judgment of June 30, 1971, Tôyama District Court, 635 Hanrei 
Jihô 17, aff'd by Judgment of August 9, 1972, Nagoya High Court, 674 Hanrei Jihô 25 (Tôyama Itai-itai 
disease case); Judgment of September 29, 1971, Niigata District Court (Niigata Minamata disease case); 
Judgment of July 24, 1972, Tsu District Court (Yokkaichi Branch) 672 Hanrei Jihô 30 (Yokkaichi asthma 
case); and Judgment of March 20, 1973, Kumamoto District Court, 696 Hanrei Jihô 15 (Kumamoto 
Minamata disease case). These cases are discussed at length in JULIAN GRESSER, KOICHIRO FUJIKURA & 
AKIO MORISHIMA, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN JAPAN 29-132 (1981). 
79
  See infra Part III.C. 
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A. The Creation of a Bottom-Up Approach to Urban Development Was 
the First Attempt to Pierce the Iron Triangle 
 Translated generally as “community building” or “community 
development,” machizukuri80 represents what planners in Japan believe to be 
the “most hopeful development in Japanese planning in many years.”81  At 
the root of machizukuri is the first attempt to pierce the iron triangle in the 
1960s and 1970s and the organization of citizen groups in response to vast 
environmental degradation and housing shortages caused by unchecked 
industrial growth in Tokyo.82  While machizukuri began to see success in the 
1960s, strong economic growth sustained an impenetrable political iron 
triangle with the singular goal of economic growth blocking much of the 
success of the early machizukuri movement. 
 The post-war industrialization and population growth of Tokyo was 
marked by the emphasis of economic growth at the expense of adequate 
housing needs and a livable urban environment.83  Prime Minister Ikeda 
Hayato justified the neglect of citizens’ needs, stating, “[w]e must first make 
the pie bigger” – a reference to the need to build an economic and industrial 
base before addressing other needs.84  This type of governance was possible 
because of the unique relationship between the state and the citizens. 85  
Where Western society “counter-poses” itself with the state, Japanese 
society has been strongly integrated with and dependent on the state for its 
very existence. 86   At the very backbone of Japanese government is the 
centralization of power.  While strongly centralized government is not 
favored in Western culture, the Japanese dependence on the state for social 
welfare stems from the success of the post-World War II governance.87 
 The centralized aspect of the government began to unravel when 
citizens’ patience for improved conditions ended after the success of the 
1964 Summer Olympics.  The 1964 Summer Olympics in Tokyo symbolized 
                                           
80
  While the term machizukuri may have a far wider application, here the term will refer only to 
bottom-up, citizen involvement in urban development projects. 
81
  SORENSEN, supra note 16, at 308. 
82
  See generally CYBRIWSKY, supra note 23, at 93-97 (discussing Tokyo’s urban problems in the 
1960s and 1970s). 
83
  SORENSEN, supra note 16, at 201-02. 
84
  CYBRIWSKY, supra note 23, at 202. 
85
  SORENSEN, supra note 16, at 52.  Government control stressed the duties instead of the rights of 
citizens. 
86
  Stephen P. Osborne, The Voluntary and Non-Profit Sector in Contemporary Japan, in THE 
VOLUNTARY AND NON-PROFIT SECTOR IN JAPAN 9 (Stephen P. Osborne ed., 2003) (citing Takayoshi 
Amenomori, Japan, in DEFINING THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A CROSS NATIONAL ANALYSIS 193 (Lester M 
Salamon & Helmut K. Anheier, eds. 1997). 
87
  Bothwell, supra note 34, at 123. 
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Japan’s emergence as an independent state. 88   Although the Olympics 
allowed the city to proceed with projects aimed at “presenting their city [to 
the world] in the best possible light,” these projects unfortunately failed to 
address the needs of Tokyo’s residential neighborhoods and left housing, 
sewers, and recreational facilities woefully inadequate. 89   These 
inadequacies came to a head when a “noisome plague of black flies 
descended on the blue-collar wards.”90  The citizens took action at the polls, 
voting the conservative municipal government out of office,91 and formed 
loosely organized groups in order to protest the poor urban environment.92 
 The citizens’ movements of the 1960s had an “idealistic but 
confrontational style,” which led to “deep-seated distrust” of the 
organizations formed through the citizens’ movement.93  The groups were 
largely anti-establishment and anti-American, which alienated them from a 
large section of Japanese society.94  In contrast to the citizens movements, 
corporations began to support organizations in the scientific and 
technological fields. 95   The government viewed the corporate-sponsored 
organizations as “a useful vehicle for stimulating the modernization process 
of Japan” and accordingly offered these organizations beneficial tax 
treatment.96  On the other hand, the citizen movement groups were viewed as 
an impediment to the growth and modernization of Japan.97  This bifurcation 
prevented a unified nonprofit field from emerging 98  and allowed the 
government to maintain significant control over nonprofit organizations.  
Despite the divided field, negative image, and strict government oversight, 
informal citizen groups continued to propagate through the 1980s and 
1990s.99   
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B. The City Planning Law of 1968 Codified the Requirement for Citizen 
Consent in Urban Development Projects 
 Statutorily, citizen involvement in Tokyo’s urban development began 
with the promulgation of the City Planning Law of 1968 (“CPL”).100  The 
CPL was the first urban development instrument that included a citizen 
consent provision and was also the first step toward decentralizing the urban 
development scheme.101  The underlying concept of the CPL was: 
To plan for the wholesome development and orderly growth of 
cities by determining the factors necessary for city planning and 
to contribute thereby to the promotion of the public welfare and 
the balanced development of the national land.102 
While the CPL citizen consent provision was the first step toward greater 
citizen involvement, it provided only weak legal remedies for local 
governments and citizens who sought to enforce the statutory 
requirements.103 
 The two most important changes embodied in the CPL were that 
it:  1) transferred planning power to the prefectural governors and 
municipalities at the city, town, and village level; and, 2) allowed for citizen 
participation.104  These changes were an effort to “enable every citizen to 
lead a healthy, civilized existence and to ensure an adequate supply of city 
services while recognizing that protecting one person’s property rights 
sometimes requires restricting the private rights of others.”105  Recognizing 
the importance of balanced and prioritized rights was ineffectual, however, 
without the proper political and economical environment to allow for a 
shifting balance of power. 
 Citizens and developers alike have decried the provisions of the CPL.  
The citizen consent provision requires developers to notify citizens of 
impending development actions that fit within tightly defined 
characteristics. 106   Tokyo ordinances limit the notification and consent 
requirements to those citizens residing within the radius equal to twice the 
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height of the development project.107  One critic of the system noted that 
while citizen movements centered on slogans like “the real leaders of 
community building are the local people,” the real reason for the citizen 
consent requirements was that “[leaders didn’t] want them to complain they 
didn’t know about [the development].”108  The reason for much of the public 
criticism was that the scope of consent required was so narrow that it did not 
adequately capture the desire of the greater community.  Furthermore, the 
consent requirements were largely de facto in nature.109  Because consent 
requirements are not judicially enforceable, 110  citizens cannot enforce 
violations of the requirement and developers are unsure of the consequences 
for failure to comply.  National ministry circulars went so far as to note that 
it would “not be appropriate” for local governments to require a developer to 
“submit a form evidencing consent from all relevant parties.”111  Nonprofit 
organizations can address these issues by providing more efficient 
communication between developers and citizens.  NPOs could also reach a 
wider breadth of citizens, thus not limiting feedback to citizens statutorily 
defined as “affected.”112 
 Developers also decry the citizen participation requirements as 
inefficient and costly.  They complain that considerable time and resources 
are spent in the effort to acquire local citizen consent and that it requires 
skillful “politicking” of local residents and bureaucrats. 113   The main 
argument against the imposition of the de facto procedural requirement of 
citizen consent is that the process is “a private process without public 
oversight.” 114   It is “problematic because it arguably compromises due 
process, the rule of law, and basic equity by vesting interest groups with de 
facto veto authority over development applications.” 115   An effective 
nonprofit sector would address this issue by balancing the bargaining power 
                                           
107
 Tokyo-To Chu Koso Kenchiku Butsu No Kenchiku Ni Kakaru Funso No Yobo To Chosei Ni Kan 
Suru Jorei [Tokyo Metropolis Ordinance on Prevention of Disputes and Adjustments Related to Medium 
and High Rise Structures], Ordinance No. 64 of 1978, art. 2(4). 
108
  SORENSEN, supra note 16, at 219 (quoting a Ministry of Construction spokesman describing the 
reason for implementing the citizens’ participation regulations). 
109
  Shibata 2003, supra note 28, at 165 (citing Takuchi Kaihatsu Shido Yoko Ni Kan Suru Hoshin 
[On Policy Measures Related to Outline Guidance on Residential Development], circular no. 54 of 1973 
(from Construction Ministry administrative vice-minister to prefectural governors), provisions 1 (IV)(5), 
1(VI)(2), 2(1)(1)).  Government issued directives are not judicially enforceable, but de facto adherence is 
common.  Id. at 153. 
110
  Id. 
111
  Id. 
112
  The breadth of NPOs would not be statutorily confined as is the current citizen consent provision 
of the CPL.  See Shibata 2003, supra note 28, at 162. 
113
  Id. at 167. 
114
  Id. 
115
  Id. 
344                                      PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 15 NO. 1 
of the developers and citizens, eliminating the need to require costly and 
inefficient consent provisions. 
 The CPL has been criticized in two other main areas.  First, the 
procedural requirements of the CPL weaken the development system 
economically. 116   They create inefficiency by hindering development 
applications with slow processing times and duplicitous administrative 
requirements. 117   Second, a lack of predictability created by the citizen 
consent requirement reduces efficiency. 
 The bottom-line argument against citizen consent requirements for 
development projects is the inefficiency of the process.  This inefficiency 
expresses itself in a number of ways.  The requirement is inefficient for 
developers because they face high costs associated with acquiring citizen 
consent.  It is also inefficient because it adds an element of unpredictability 
to the development process.  The citizen consent requirements also fail to 
consider the inequity between citizens and developers.  This inequity may 
lead to developers simply purchasing citizens’ consent, which effectively 
destroys the goal of the citizen consent requirement.  Finally, the CPL citizen 
consent requirement is inefficient because it fails to inform or capture the 
consent of an adequate breadth of the community, emphasizing the interests 
of micro-communities instead of the Tokyo community at large.  The 
development of a strong nonprofit sector could balance the bargaining power 
between citizens and developers and eliminate these inefficiencies.  This 
balance would remove the need for statutory consent requirements. 
C. After the Passage of the City Planning Law, Citizens Remained Active 
at the Polls and in the Courtroom 
 Citizens continued to take action at the polls after the passage of the 
City Planning Law of 1968 by voting members of the long-serving 
conservative municipal government of Tokyo out of office. 118   Minobe 
Ryōkichi was elected governor of Tokyo after running as a government 
skeptic who longed for the return of the habitable city environment that he 
remembered as a boy.119  Minobe pledged taiwa (dialog) with citizens and 
instituted a “civil minimum” policy that cracked down on Tokyo’s urban 
maladies. 120   It was under this vision that the “Tokyo for the People” 
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campaign was introduced in 1972.121  According to Governor Minobe, “[i]n 
giving priority to Tokyo’s development as the economic and industrial hub 
of the nation after World War II, the welfare of its citizens was forced to take 
a back seat.  Creating a good living environment was secondary.”122  While 
the thrust of his campaign remains the impetus of today’s urban planning 
schemes from the “My Town Tokyo” plan to the Long-Term Development 
plans discussed below, 123  the goals of the plan remained largely unmet 
because, despite the social ills of the society, Japan’s economic growth 
continued. 
 In addition to taking action at the polls, citizens mobilized against the 
government.  Local governments received as many as 75,000 pollution-
related complaints in 1971.124  Many of these complaints gained national 
media attention and the movements began to see favorable court response to 
the petitions.125  Despite the increased citizen mobilization, the tremendous 
amount of energy put towards the movement resulted in relatively few 
substantive results.126  Even with the limited success of these movements, it 
has been noted that: 
In the longer run, even though so many citizens’ movements 
achieved little for their efforts, the cumulative impact of their 
very numbers proved great, as this huge wave of local 
opposition movements transformed Japanese politics, especially 
at the local level, and led to an electoral crisis for the ruling 
LDP government in the late 1960s and early 1970s.127 
In short, the citizen movements of the 1960s and 1970s were a good start 
toward effective citizen involvement, but were by no means the end of the 
road for the movement. 
 While Tokyo’s goals have been identified and citizen involvement 
began to enter the political process of Tokyo’s urban development in the 
1960s and 1970s, the success of machizukuri was limited because of the 
strong economic growth of Tokyo occurring at the same time.128  Between 
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1972 and 1986, the number of employees in Tokyo grew from 6.7 million to 
8.0 million, and the number of business establishments grew from 643,973 
to 797,483.129  The strong and growing economic environment allowed big 
business to remain closely allied with the bureaucracy and the legislature, 
which effectively blocked outside interests from having any significant 
influence on the governance of urban development. 
IV. SINCE THE EARLY 1970S, TOKYO HAS FORMULATED GOALS TO MEET 
THE SOCIO-CULTURAL NEEDS OF ITS CITIZENS, BUT THESE GOALS 
HAVE NOT BEEN IMPLEMENTED TO DATE  
 As a result of early citizen participation movements, the Tokyo 
Municipal Government began to openly express the goals for Tokyo urban 
development.  Although the socio-cultural goals of the city began to be 
recognized and publicized, the city faced many impediments to actually 
satisfying the lofty objectives expressed in the government publications. 
A. The Tokyo Government Formulated and Revised Its Goals for Urban 
Development for Several Decades 
 In the 1970s, Tokyo’s city planners began to recognize that the tension 
between the developers and the citizens was growing because citizen 
interests had been neglected for decades. 130   Buildings were built and 
demolished and roads opened without the knowledge of the citizens.  The 
town “that was once [the citizens’] own,” the drafters of the Second Long 
Term Plan stressed, “change[d] to an ‘unknown town’ before they realized 
what was happening.”131   
 Tokyo’s government recognized the need for well-planned 
development.  The city has also had unique, albeit tragic, opportunities to 
revamp its city planning goals in order to meet the needs of its citizens.  
However, several obstacles have prevented Tokyo from fully realizing its 
objectives.  Two of the main impediments in the past have been booming 
population growth132 and a dominating and unilateral need for economic 
growth.133  Today, with Japan being a dominant and stable world power, 
Tokyo has the unique opportunity to, at last, successfully meet the dynamic 
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and diverse needs of each of its interests—citizens, government, and 
economy. 
 With a stabilized population, the Tokyo Municipal Government 
(“TMG”) saw the need to redefine its redevelopment goals.  The intent was 
to change the urban development scheme from “demand-led” development 
that is always trying to keep up with infrastructure development, to “policy-
led” urban development that satisfies objectives with the participation and 
cooperation of various entities.134  The My Town Tokyo plan documented 
the needs and desires of Tokyo in the publication City Planning of Tokyo,135 
a precursor to the subsequent Long Term Plans.136  The basic goal was to 
“create a safe and invigorating city that the citizens c[ould] call their 
home.”137 
 The My Town Concept Council and the Tokyo Long Term Planning 
Council launched the long-term planning scheme of Tokyo in the early 
1980s. 138   The planning documents were updated first in 1986 (Second 
Long-Term Plan) and again in 1990 (Third Long-Term Plan). 139   They 
contain two main ideals: “a ‘basic concept’ that projects an image of Tokyo 
as it should be in the twenty-first century, and a ‘10-year operating plan’ that 
sets out specific projects for the TMG to pursue.” 140   These plans 
demonstrate the vigor with which Tokyo has approached its land use 
policy.141  The illustrative and concisely written documents are accessible to 
the general public and signal that the TMG wants this plan to be well 
received by each of its citizens.142  The accessibility of the documents also 
serves as world-wide notice that Tokyo has set, and will continue striving to 
meet, the wide range of its city’s needs.   
                                           
134
  Bureau of City Planning Tokyo Metropolitan Government, A New City Planning Vision for Tokyo, 
UNITED NATIONS ONLINE NETWORK IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCE (UNPAN) § 1, 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN015060.pdf (last viewed May 15, 
2005) [hereinafter UNPAN]. 
135
  See generally TOKYO METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT, CITY PLANNING OF TOKYO (1983) 
[hereinafter CITY PLANNING OF TOKYO]. 
136
 See generally TOKYO METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT, LONG-TERM PLAN FOR TOKYO METROPOLIS 
(1984) [hereinafter FIRST LONG-TERM PLAN]; SECOND LONG-TERM PLAN, supra note 131; TOKYO 
METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT, THE THIRD LONG-TERM PLAN FOR THE TOKYO METROPOLIS (1991) 
[hereinafter THIRD LONG-TERM PLAN]. 
137
  CITY PLANNING OF TOKYO, supra note 135, at Foreword. 
138
  See generally A HUNDRED YEARS OF TOKYO CITY PLANNING, supra note 62. 
139
  Id. at 92. 
140
  See generally THIRD LONG-TERM PLAN, supra note 136. 
141
  The plans were well distributed, written in a style accessible to average citizens, and even made 
widely available in English language versions.  See FIRST LONG-TERM PLAN, supra note 136; Second 
LONG-TERM PLAN, supra note 131; THIRD LONG-TERM PLAN, supra note 136. 
142
  See generally FIRST LONG-TERM PLAN, supra note 136; SECOND LONG-TERM PLAN, supra note 
131; THIRD LONG-TERM PLAN, supra note 136. 
348                                      PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 15 NO. 1 
 Together with the My Town Tokyo Plan, the Bureau of City Planning 
in the Tokyo Metropolitan Government specifically listed five goals for 
urban development in Tokyo.  The Bureau of City Planning considers of 
great importance: 
 
1. Maintenance and development of economic dynamics 
that ensure international competitiveness; 
2. Coexistence with environment-enabling continuous 
prosperity; 
3. Creation and diffusion of original urban culture; 
4. Realization of high-quality living environment in which 
people can live safely and healthily; 
5. Participation and cooperation of various entities 
including metropolitan citizens, corporations, and NPO’s, 
etc.143 
 
While these priorities are extremely broad, they represent the basic goals of 
Tokyo urban development and redevelopment in the beginning of the 
twenty-first century. 
B. Tokyo’s Urban Development Goals Have Repeatedly Met with 
Significant Challenges and Have Not Been Implemented 
 There are several factors that make land use policy particularly 
important and challenging for Tokyo.  Central to this challenge is the need to 
balance the interests of a highly advanced and technical society with having 
a livable city with cultural ideologies and traditions.144  The often conflicting 
goals of economic growth and urban culture have left Tokyo with two 
idealized images—a modern, highly advanced, and developed city that is 
globally competitive in the business sector, and an image of a green, lightly 
developed, extremely “livable” environment that allows for peace and 
tranquility.145  While the cultural importance of land use planning is by no 
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means unique to Japan, it is apparent that Japanese culture places great 
importance on the environment in which they live, work and play.146 
 In addition to the dichotomy between economy and culture, Tokyo has 
encountered and must plan for future natural and human disasters.  Japan’s  
history of tragic and devastating disasters has forced Tokyo to rebuild, nearly 
from scratch, several times.  These tragedies have, however, implanted 
Tokyo with the feeling that the city is not a static entity, but rather, an ever 
changing, evolving, and improving instrument of the people and 
government.147  The history of destruction has also allowed the government 
to gain significant power in a paternalistic sense.148  Despite recognized 
opportunities to meet the development needs of the city, however, Tokyo has 
never fully met its socio-cultural goals.  In the wake of the destruction of the 
early twentieth century, citizens relied on the government to rebuild the city 
and the government accomplished this task.149  It is precisely this history of 
strong urban recovery and economic growth with highly centralized 
governance that creates a challenge to decentralization and the introduction 
of citizen participation. 150   Koshiro Ishida, the government minister 
responsible for improving public access said: “We felt we had to catch up 
with the West after the chaos left by the war and so did not pay attention to 
rights.  But that attitude has to change now.”151 
 Tokyo is also the capital city of the third largest national economy in 
the world behind the United States and China.152  Beyond being the seat of 
the national government,153 Tokyo is the financial and business capital154 as 
well as the hub of popular culture in Japan.155  These roles put immense 
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pressure on Tokyo to meet the many needs of its citizens.156  It also faces the 
pressure of being a growing metropolis.157  Tokyo’s ubiquitous appeal to 
many different sections of the nation has created a sprawling city, pressed 
for both space and infrastructure.158  These unique attributes of Tokyo make 
its land use policies central to the continued success of Tokyo as a world-
wide center of commerce, culture, and livability.   
V. THE EMERGING NONPROFIT SECTOR PRESENTS THE FIRST VIABLE 
MEANS OF MEETING TOKYO’S URBAN DEVELOPMENT GOALS 
The nonprofit sector that is beginning to develop under the NPO Law 
of 1998 has the potential to overcome past impediments to citizen 
participation in Tokyo’s urban development scheme.  Citizen groups in 
Tokyo have been attempting for decades to influence the city’s urban 
development.  Today’s political and economic environments have opened 
the political structure of the government to allow participation by the 
nonprofit sector.  Along with this increased political openness, the nonprofit 
sector has gained significant legitimacy both legally and in the opinion of 
the general public.  While the nonprofit sector has realized unprecedented 
success, it still has significant strides to take before it is a truly viable 
conduit to meaningful public participation.  Tokyo’s current environment 
provides a unique opportunity to take these strides and create a viable 
nonprofit sector. 
A. Political and Economic Obstacles Have Prevented the Creation of a 
Nonprofit Sector That Effectively Represents the Citizens of Tokyo 
 While the government has recognized the need for a viable sector 
representing the needs of the citizens for decades,159  there have been a 
number of significant barriers to the establishment of such a sector.  The 
major challenges facing the development of a nonprofit sector are the role of 
government, the source of funding, and the legitimacy of the nonprofit 
sector.160 
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 Historically, the Japanese government has been a provider for its 
citizens161 and the government’s desire to continue as provider is the first 
major obstacle to the establishment of a strong nonprofit sector.  Through 
much of the twentieth century, citizens looked to the Japanese government to 
provide them with necessities such as adequate housing and economic 
security.  The government capably met these needs.  The current socio-
cultural needs of the citizens cannot, however, be provided by the 
government, and the citizens and government alike have struggled to find 
the appropriate provider of such services.  As Japan’s governance shifted 
away from the “Japan, Inc.” model of post-war Japan,162 the relationship 
between the Japanese government and its citizens has changed.  Katsuji 
Imata, President/CEO of Japan-US Community Education and Exchange, 
discussed this change: 
Bureaucrats won’t give up their territory.  And the sad thing is 
that they are not villains.  They are not “control freaks.”  
Rather, they are paternalistic.  After all, they are the ones that 
created the economic miracle in Japan’s postwar era by setting 
policy priorities and focusing of the welfare of the corporate 
sector . . . .  They can’t see how the society will sustain itself if 
they don’t play the fatherly role.  As a result, people are 
suffocated by the same-old uniform measures in different 
social, economic and educational policies.163 
The nonprofit sector is the appropriate mechanism to overcome this 
challenge and meet the socio-cultural needs of citizens. 
 Underlying the Japanese system of governance is the basic public 
understanding of what the public sector means.  The preconceived notion in 
Japan is that “public” means “government;” the idea that “public” may also 
mean “citizen” is foreign to the citizens of Japan.164  The current nonprofit 
sector in Japan is referred to as the “third sector.”165  The “third sector” is so 
heavily influenced by the government and big business that the Japanese 
term for the third sector, dai san sekuta, refers to a “hybrid sector of quasi-
public, quasi-business organizations,” not an independent sector.166  With 
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this understanding, the NPOs are not seen as makers of public policy, but 
rather as pawns merely serving the interests of the government.167 
 For the NPO sector to be successful, it must be truly independent from 
the government and bureaucracy.  If it remains significantly influenced by 
the authoritarian government, it will not effectively influence society. 168  
One way to describe the relationship between the government and nonprofit 
sector is that of “patron-client,” where NPOs are seen as protected or 
supported by the government.169  The close supervision of NPOs through the 
relevant ministries demonstrates this relationship.170  NPOs are required to 
register with the ministry or ministries that govern the subject matter of the 
organization’s activities. 171   The ministry also has the discretion as to 
whether or not it should grant an organization’s application for 
incorporation.172  In 1999, one organization sought to incorporate with the 
intention of providing support to Indonesia, but authorities denied its 
application demanding that the organization change the recipient of its aid to 
“developing nations.” 173   Such governmental controls over incorporation 
significantly impede NPOs’ independence. 
 In addition to the close supervisory role that the government plays, 
NPOs also rely heavily on government funding for their operations, which 
further erodes organizational independence.174  Funding for NPOs can come 
from numerous sources, including direct grants from government and 
corporations, private donations, and membership fees. 175   Empirical 
evidence demonstrates that the source of NPO revenue is divided as follows:  
1.3% – private contributions; 38.3% – public sector payments, and 60.4% – 
private fees and payments (which include primarily tuition to private 
schools).176  The development and housing sector has a similar, but more 
polarized division of revenue:  0.0% – private contributions; 24.4% – public 
sector payments; and; 75.6% – private fees and payments. 177   The 
government can maintain significant control over the nonprofit sector 
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through this type of funding.  By failing to provide adequate tax incentives 
to individuals, the government is limiting private donations that would 
strengthen the independence of the organizations.178 
 Donations to government entities are fully tax deductible for corporate 
entities and are deductible for up to one-quarter of household income after a 
¥10,000 threshold donation is made.179   In contrast, donations to public 
interest organizations are tax deductible for corporations only when there is 
an “urgent [public] need.”180  Furthermore, donations are only tax deductible 
if the organization has applied for and received special tax status from an 
appropriate ministry.181  If the ministry does not support an organization, it 
can simply deny the organization’s application for special tax treatment, 
effectively limiting a substantially viable source of potential revenue.  That 
this procedural hurdle, however logical, is at the full discretion of the 
relevant ministry, severely limits NPOs’ independence because only those 
NPOs that reflect the interests of government receive funding.182 
 Corporate interests also create a major challenge to the viability of the 
nonprofit sector because of the tenuous relationship they have with the 
nonprofit sector.  On one hand, the nonprofit sector relies heavily on the 
corporate world for financial backing.183  On the other hand, the sector is 
threatened by corporate influence in times of economic stagnation.184  NPOs 
are threatened for two reasons when there is a weak economy.  First, reduced 
profit for corporate entities leads directly to reduced revenue for nonprofit 
organizations.185  Second, corporate entities expect powerful government—a 
threat to nonprofit independence in times of economic stagnation. 186  
Importantly, however, both the economic and nonprofit sectors share a 
common goal of economic growth.  This common goal must be emphasized 
in order to foster a relationship between the two sectors, thus avoiding a 
sense of divisiveness.  There is also strong evidence that increased social 
capital leads to aggregate economic growth.187   
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 The legitimacy of nonprofit organizations is the final major obstacle 
to the viability of the sector.188  In order to build strong NPOs, citizens must 
understand the importance of the nonprofit sector and contribute to the 
organizations.189  Currently, Japanese nonprofits have shallow support bases 
with only a few NPOs having more than 1000 supporting members. 190  
Support for Japanese nonprofit organizations is simply not a part of the 
culture. 191   Even with NPO growth and development, only twenty-two 
percent of adults with full-time jobs engage in charitable activities. 192  
Without a strong base of citizen support, Tokyo will continue to struggle to 
create a viable nonprofit sector.  A leading scholar in the nonprofit field in 
Japan, Yasuo Harima, states that “[citizens] must change [their] paradigm 
from individualism to community-ism . . . .  NPO’s are ‘community.’  Their 
value is in their performance as community.” 193   The strength of the 
nonprofit sector lies not with the strength of the organization’s officers, the 
amount of government support, or the amount of local support alone, but 
rather with each of these components working in unison towards a common 
goal. 194  
B. Political and Economic Changes in the 1990s Allowed for the 
Creation of the First Viable Framework for a Nonprofit Sector 
 The political and economic setting of the 1990s in Tokyo weakened 
the rigid political system and allowed citizen interests to gain a foothold in 
Tokyo’s governance.  The bursting of the economic bubble in Japan, as well 
as political scandal and the devastation of the Kobe Earthquake in 1995 led 
to the promulgation of the Law to Promote Specified Nonprofit Activities of 
1998 (“NPO Law”). 195   The NPO Law is the keystone of the current 
framework for the nonprofit sector and its promulgation can provide the 
momentum needed to build a more effective nonprofit sector. 
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 Japan’s economic downturn in the early 1990s set the stage for the 
growth of the nonprofit sector.196  The 1990s marked the end of Japan’s 
inflated land market and brought Japan’s unprecedented history of economic 
growth to an end.197  The end of economic growth severely reduced the 
finances of central and local governments and limited the government’s 
ability to support programs such as “lifetime employment.”198  With fewer 
governmental resources, the previously dominant political powers were 
unable to appease competing interests, thus weakening the ubiquity of the 
iron triangle.199   
 Corruption in the bureaucracy came to light in the wake of the 
stagnant economy and further weakened the political iron triangle.200  While 
corruption was nothing new to Japan, citizens forced accountability onto the 
politicians after the economic collapse.201  The corruption led to a political 
shakeup and ultimately to the Liberal Democratic Party (“LDP”) losing 
power in 1993 for the first time since 1955.202  This shakeup allowed for 
electoral reforms, which were expected to reduce the LDP’s power and 
allow for other parties to gain more influence over the legislature.203   
 Finally, the Kobe Earthquake of 1995 brought significant changes to 
the role of the nonprofit sector. 204   The inadequacy of the government 
response to the Kobe Earthquake brought poor bureaucratic governance into 
the public’s view, while concomitantly highlighting the efficiency of non-
governmental organizations and the voluntary response of citizens.205  The 
bureaucratic response has been described as, “ministries jealously guard[ing] 
their bailiwicks” and sectionalism that “inhibit[ed] cooperation or effective 
action.”206  Importantly, however, the Kobe Earthquake was not the catalyst 
that began the volunteer activity.  Rather, it allowed for widespread 
recognition of the preexisting voluntary and nonprofit sector.207  Volunteer 
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groups began in earnest in the late 1980s alongside the growing prominence 
of the corporate citizenship movement.208   
 Along with the Kobe Earthquake, the media was vitally important to 
the growth of the nonprofit sector.  The media generally has three effects on 
the policy making process:  “1) identifying issues and setting the agenda for 
policymakers, 2) influencing attitudes and values toward policy issues, and 
3) changing the behavior of voters and decision makers.”209  Media attention 
to the voluntary response to the Kobe Earthquake is a prime example of how 
the media influenced each of these areas and forced the promulgation of the 
NPO Law.210   
 The purpose of the NPO Law is to promote the development of 
nonprofit activities.211  In order to achieve this goal, the NPO Law provides 
incorporated status to NPOs and makes tax exempt status available to the 
organizations.  Although the NPO Law does not remove NPOs from 
ministerial supervision,212 it allows citizen-led activities to proceed with less 
government intrusion.213  The burst of the economic bubble in Japan was 
marked by political scandals and wide-scale skepticism of bureaucratic 
competency.214  Many of the scandals either involved fraudulent dealings 
directly between politicians and NPO officials,215 or led to the demand for 
government accountability for misdealings with NPOs.216  At the time of 
these scandals, it was nearly impossible for NPOs to incorporate as legal 
entities and many NPOs felt that legal incorporation was the best means to 
improving political strength and legitimacy. 217   Although the Japanese 
Constitution provides for freedom of association,218 the Civil Code allows 
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only a limited number of groups to gain status as a legal entity.219  Prior to 
the NPO Law, the first obstacle to forming a legal corporation was that the 
group had to act in the public interest.220  The second obstacle was that the 
recognition of a group was at the “discretion of the competent ministry.”221  
Specifically, NPOs felt that incorporation would allow the groups to:  1) 
improve public credibility, 2) increase the ability to qualify for public 
donations, 3) demonstrate that the group does not seek to make a profit, and 
4) allow for more favorable tax treatment.222 
 The NPO Law has, however, been criticized as being an inadequate 
means of achieving increased NPO legitimacy.  The first weakness in the 
NPO Law is that instead of amending the Civil Code, which provides the 
general law for the incorporation of NPOs, the NPO Law is a “special law” 
contained within the Code.223  The NPO Law requires that an organization fit 
within one of seventeen exclusive categories provided within the statute.224  
Most troublesome about the required categorization is that the prefectural 
government is responsible for deciding whether or not an organization fits 
within one of the categories.  This type of bureaucratic control over the 
nonprofit sector limits its effectiveness. 
 The fact that the economy has slowed, 225  the LDP’s power has 
weakened,226 and there is a general acknowledgment of the need to improve 
the urban environment with an eye towards meeting the socio-cultural needs 
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of the citizens makes today a unique time ripe for the development of a 
nonprofit sector.227   
C. Tokyo Can Realize a Successful Nonprofit Sector by Improving the 
Sector’s Legitimacy and Independence 
 The Japanese government gave the nonprofit sector the framework to 
enter Japanese governance through the NPO Law, but now there are a 
number of steps that are essential to maintaining a politically salient 
nonprofit sector.  The nonprofit sector must meet several objectives that are 
closely interrelated in order to implement a successful nonprofit sector.  The 
nonprofit sector must improve its legitimacy and independence.  These 
elements are closely related and without the growth of each element the 
nonprofit sector will not be effective. 
 The first goal of the nonprofit sector should be to build legitimacy.  
Legitimacy is an issue that nonprofit organizations must deal with regardless 
of the strength of the nonprofit sector.  In the United States, organizations 
must continuously monitor their operations in order to maintain 
legitimacy.228  Japan has an even more challenging task, having to build the 
legitimacy of the sector from scratch.  The first step toward building 
legitimacy should be for nonprofit organizations to act locally; this is 
particularly true in the field of urban development. 
Urban development issues are acutely local—for example, zoning 
laws can affect people in a block-by-block manner and transportation 
decisions can have specific and drastic effects on a particular neighborhood.  
For this reason, gaining local recognition should be the primary goal for 
NPOs seeking public participation in the urban planning field.  Hideaki 
Uemura, chair of the Citizens’ Diplomatic Center for the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, addressed the importance of the involvement of local 
citizens, stating: “As the concrete assignment . . . we have to make sure that 
NPO activities benefit local people as much as possible.”229  Local people 
would support NPOs if there were local benefits. 230   This means that 
organizations must work at the grassroots level in order to build local 
support and recognition.  Today, Japanese citizens largely do not know what 
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the nonprofit sector is capable of or what it aims to achieve.231  Building 
legitimacy must also start with community outreach.  Outreach should 
include introducing children to community service activities and community 
involvement, encouraging such activity at a young age.  Without building the 
legitimacy of the sector, the next two goals of the nonprofit sector will be 
impossible. 
 Building a strong financial base is a critical goal for nonprofit 
organizations, largely because without a viable financial base, independent 
from governmental funding, nonprofit organizations remain susceptible to 
government control.  In essence, government funds become the “tail that 
wags the dog.” 232   Article 89 of the Japanese Constitution states that 
government funding cannot be distributed to organizations that are not under 
the influence of a government agency. 233   Therefore, when nonprofit 
organizations receive government funding, they must also agree to abide by 
government regulations. 234   This defeats the purpose of having an 
independent nonprofit sector representing the needs and interests of the 
citizens.  It is vital that the nonprofit sector act independently from the state.  
A successful sector is one that “exists over and against the state, in partial 
independence from it, . . . a web of autonomous associations, independent of 
the state.”235  This leaves nonprofit organizations in a serious quandary:  
receive government funds and sacrifice independence, or reject government 
funding and rely on prohibitively scarce alternative funding sources.  The 
only other potentially viable source of funding is through corporate support, 
which also fails to solve the issue of NPO independence.  This financial 
dilemma demonstrates the strong need for private support of nonprofit 
organizations and legal reform to allow for more flexible use of government 
funds. 
The financial dilemma also suggests that there is a need for tax reform 
to stimulate and encourage charitable contributions from individuals and 
corporations.  The justification for such tax reform was well stated by the 
United States Supreme Court:   
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The exemption from taxation of money and property devoted to 
charitable and other purposes is based on the theory that the 
Government is compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief 
from financial burdens which would otherwise have to be met 
by appropriations from other public funds, and by the benefits 
resulting from the promotion of the general welfare.236 
The Japanese government must be willing and able to support the nonprofit 
sector without encroaching on its independence.  There is strong evidence 
that balancing power between the public (government), private 
(entrepreneurial) and civil (nonprofit) sectors is vital to a stable 
government.237  The success of the nonprofit sector will help balance the 
control of power in Japanese urban development. 
 The final critical element to the success of the nonprofit sector is the 
development of a strong institutional infrastructure. 238   A strong 
infrastructure includes having adequately trained and competent officers and 
managers within the nonprofit organizations. 239   Jerry Inman, former 
representative of the Asia Foundation in Tokyo, states that development of 
this infrastructure is “essential and precedes NPOs being taken seriously by 
the Japanese government and corporate sector and, maybe more importantly, 
by their international NPO colleagues.”240  It is at this point that a vicious 
cycle is created: 241  NPOs lack the financial means to attract trained 
professionals, which reduces the sector’s ability to attract funding. 242  
Increased training in public policy and administration, particularly in regard 
to the nonprofit sector, may supply the sector with more adequate human 
resources.  Not only must there be professionals trained generally in 
nonprofit management, there must be city planners who understand how to 
operate a successful NPO.  Such training may also create positive 
externalities by increasing the legitimacy of the nonprofit sector and 
improving the public’s knowledge of how the sector operates.  Historically, 
there has been a high level of prestige attached to entering the civil 
service.243  In order to draw upon the top graduates from the University of 
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Tokyo and other leading academic institutions, the nonprofit sector must 
gain legitimacy. 
 While the nonprofit sector faces an uphill battle to overcome these 
challenges, there is significant momentum in favor of the nonprofit sector.244  
It is important that pressure is maintained on the government to continue 
passing favorable legislation that will allow the sector to reach its potential.  
The most important area of support for the nonprofit sector related to urban 
development is from the local government.  Local government maintains 
significant control of development permitting.245   Therefore, without the 
support of the local government, NPOs will not have the momentum needed 
to impact urban developers. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 The recently developed framework for a nonprofit sector in Japan 
represents the first viable opportunity to incorporate the interests of the 
citizens of Tokyo into the city’s urban development scheme.  The NPO Law 
is the backbone of this framework.  Continued support of this statute, 
together with government, corporate, and citizen support of nonprofit 
organizations will allow the nonprofit sector to blossom into a politically 
salient entity capable of balancing the urban development interests of the 
government, corporations, and citizens.  The growth of the nonprofit sector 
will leverage citizens’ ability to affect positive social policy in Tokyo’s 
continued urban development.  This growth is especially important in light 
of the conflict between the Tokyo citizens’ sense of place and Japan’s 
centralized legal structure.  Without an adequate nonprofit sector, the urban 
environment will continue to be shaped by economic forces, as opposed to 
citizen participation.  Development projects such as the Kunitachi 
condominium case continue today.  Without the development of a strong 
nonprofit sector, citizens will be unable to influence the growth and 
development of their own urban environment. 
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